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Generalizing DET curves across application
scenarios
Norman Poh and Chi Ho Chan
Abstract—Assessing biometric performance is challenging because an experimental outcome depends on the choice of
demographics, and the chosen application scenario of an experiment. If one can quantify biometric samples into good, bad, and
ugly categories for one application, the proportion of these categories is likely to be different for another application. As a result,
a typical performance curve of a biometric experiment cannot generalise to another different application setting, even though
the same system is used. We propose an algorithm that is capable of generalising a biometric performance curve in terms
of Detection Error Trade-off (DET) or equivalently Receiver’s Operating Characteristics (ROC), by allowing the user (system
operator, policy-maker, biometric researcher) to explicitly set the proportion of data differently. This offers the possibility for the
user to simulate different operating conditions that can better match the setting of a target application. We demonstrated the
utility of the algorithm in three scenarios, namely, estimating the system performance under varying quality; spoof and zero-effort
attacks; and cross-device matching. Based on the results of 1300 use-case experiments, we found that the quality of prediction
on unseen (test) data, measured in terms of coverage, is typically between 60% and 80%, which is significantly better than
random, that is, 50%.
Index Terms—biometrics, perform evaluation/prediction, bootstrap subset.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Biometric authentication is a process of verifying
an identity claim using a person’s behavioural and
physiological characteristics. Several factors affect a
biometric system’s performance. Some of them are
the deformable nature of biometric traits, corruption
by environmental noise, variability of biometric traits
over time, the state of users (especially behavioural
biometrics) and occlusion by the user’s accessories.
As a consequence, even if two biometric samples are
acquired from the same user, the system cannot pro-
duce exactly the same output score. Therefore, when
assessing the performance, the uncertainty introduced
by these numerous and often uncontrolled distortions
has to be taken into account.
The goal of this paper is to deliver a tool that
allows performance evaluators and vendors to explore
the effect of different factors on the resultant system
performance. For instance, if they know that there
are certain proportions of “good”, “bad”, and “ugly”
samples, then the proposed tool enables them to
freely mix the prior probability so as to match the
specifications of a target application. This allows a
certain degree of generalisation to a typical biometric
performance curve, in the form of Detection Error
Trade-off (DET) or equivalently Receiver’s Operating
Characteristics (ROC) curve. This curve is a plot of
False Non-match Rate (FNMR) or False Rejection Rate
in the Y-axis versus the False Match Rate (FMR) or
False Acceptance Rate in the X-axis.
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We present three use-case scenarios where our bio-
metric performance simulation tool can be used:
• Assessing biometric system performance under
different attack strategies: The robustness of a
biometric system under attack depends on the
types of material that are used to produce a
spoof sample, the level of skill of the impostor,
and/or simply the resources available to an im-
postor. Attacks that are easy to carry out such
as zero-effort attack (i.e. live imposter sample)
may be more prevalent than expensive but more
destructive ones. The proposed algorithm offers
the possibility of evaluating the robustness of a
biometric system under different assumptions in
the proportion of attacks that can better match a
target adverse operating environment.
• Assessing biometric system performance oper-
ating with multiple sensors: In border controls,
it is expected that a biometric system will operate
with several sensors. For instance, a biometric
sensor installed at the port of entry may be
necessarily not the same as the one installed at
a corresponding port of exit. In practice, it is
common to have several ports of entry and ports
of exit. In another scenario, older worn sensors
may be replaced by newer ones but of a different
type. In both examples, one has to deal with a
practical problem whereby a biometric system
has to compare two samples acquired by two
different sensors. Under cross-sensor compari-
son, the system performance may be suboptimal,
e.g., [8], [9]. This degradation can be observed
in all common used biometric traits in border
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control such as face, fingerprint and iris. When
a biometric system operates in an environment
where there is a certain mixing of proportions
of same-device versus cross-device comparisons,
the proposed algorithm can be used to simulate
the performance. This permits a more realistic
estimation of the number of false alarm cases.
• Assessing biometric system performance under
varying sample quality or operating conditions:
It is now well accepted that biometric system
performance is dependent on a sample popula-
tion to some extent. For instance, it has been
documented that the fingerprint recognition rates
of older women and workers in certain industries
are likely to be lower than those of the general
population [5], [6], [4]. When the proportion of
demographics of a design data set is signifi-
cantly different from that of a target operating
environment, it is unlikely that the biometric
performance curve, as measured on the design
data set, is representative of the target operating
environment. By appropriately setting the prior
of the demographics, the proposed algorithm can
be used to produce a certain generalised perfor-
mance that better matches the target population
of biometric end-users.
One pre-requisite to predicting or modelling the
biometric system performance under different oper-
ating conditions is the need to quantify the certainty
of the predicted performance, e.g., in terms of upper
or lower performance bands. For this reason, we
derive the confidence interval around a predicted DET
curve using a bootstrap strategy. Unfortunately, the
conventional bootstrap sampling is not appropriate
since it assumes that the samples are independent
and identically distributed. Indeed, the scores of a bio-
metric experiment outcome contain correlation struc-
tures that violate this assumption. In particular, the
similarity scores of the match pair are correlated. In
fact, similar correlation structure also exists for non-
match scores as well [11]. Consequently, the resultant
confidence intervals are under-estimated [1]. For this
reason, we shall use a two-step bootstrap strategy
proposed in [10].
A demonstration of bootstrapped DET curves and
their resultant confidence intervals is shown in Fig-
ure 1. For a video animation, check out http://youtu.
be/VUgJ1xh4sOU.
Our contributions can be summarised as follow:
• An algorithmic framework to generalize DET
curves to different prior probability of factors
• Deployment of bootstrap subset, coupled with
DET angles, in order to derive confidence inter-
vals around the predicted DET curve.
• Objective assessment of the proposed algorithm
on 1,300 experiments due to 4 data sets and 13
use-case scenarios, in terms of coverage, on an
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Fig. 1: An example of bootstrapped DET curve.
The thin blue dashed curves are bootstrapped sample
of DET curves. The thick red dashed lines indicate
the lower and upper bound of the median curve
(continuous red line).
unseen data set with a different subject popula-
tion.
To date, a DET curve remains ’locked’ on the data
set it has been evaluating. Our tool makes it possible
to generalize a DET curve to an unseen scenario.
This remains a difficult problem with little research
addressing this issue directly. Therefore, we have
worked to fill this gap and demonstrated the feasi-
bility of generalizing DET curves.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows: a methodology of our proposed algorithm is
described in Section 2. In Section 3, we present some
use-cases and demonstration. Discussions on how
well our proposed procedure predicts an unseen DET
curve using the confidence intervals are presented in
Section 4. Lastly Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 METHODOLOGY
2.1 Overview
To predict biometric performance on a new unseen
operating condition, we first need to determine a
number of noise factors in the similarity scores for
both the match and non-match comparisons sepa-
rately. Let us consider the following scenarios:
• Matching under different attack types: It is pos-
sible and indeed desirable to divide non-match
scores into their nature of attack, such as zero-
effort attack and spoof attack based on different
fabrication materials.
• Matching with multiple sensors: In a multi-
sensor environment, it is common to have the
template produced by one sensor to be matched
by a query sample produced by another sensor.
If there are N sensor, then the total number of
factors is “n choose 2”, or n(n− 1)/2 + n for any
combination of two sensors and the template and
query generated by the same sensor. Thus, if there
three sensors enumerated by S1, S2, S3, we have
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Fig. 2: The architecture of the proposed system. There
are |Q| negative score sets and |Q| positive score sets.
to consider up to three cross-device combinations,
namely, (S1, S2), (S1, S3), and (S2, S3), and three
matching sensor comparisons, namely (S1, S1),
(S2, S2), and (S3, S3). Therefore, there are six
score sets for the match (or genuine) comparisons
and another six score sets for non-match (or
impostor) comparisons.
• Matching with varying sample quality: With
different sample quality, it is possible to quantise
the samples into several categories. For example,
the NIST Fingerprint Quality Assessment soft-
ware, NFIQ, quantises a biometric sample into
five levels of quality. Based on this automatically
derived category, we divide the similarity scores –
for the match and non-match comparisons – into
their respective quality levels.
• Matching under different demographics: Some
biometric systems may exhibit performance bias
by age or gender. This gender bias is evident in
the past evaluation of speaker and face biometric
systems [12], for instance. Therefore, under de-
mographic shifts, it is reasonable to expect that
the system may perform differently for different
demographic sectors. For this reason, it is sensible
to use the demographic information as a factor.
We now describe the overall architecture of the
proposed system. Let us consider the non-match com-
parison scores first. For each of the score sets repre-
senting a given factor, one can proceed to estimating
its cumulative density function cdf, from which a
number of bootstraps can be generated. The boot-
strapped curves are then combined in such a way
that if there are |Q| score sets each containing N
bootstrapped cdf curves, one obtains N combined
non-match cdf s. The combination module weighs the
|Q| factors using mixing coefficients that are set by
the user. The process is then repeated for the match
comparison scores, hence obtaining another N com-
bined match cdf curves. The two sets of curves are
combined to form N bootstrapped DET curves from
which the confidence intervals of the DET curves are
estimated. Figure 2 illustrates a data flow diagram of
the proposed algorithm.
The basis for which the cdf s of different factors are
combined is rooted in the Bayesian theorem, which is
described in Section 2.2. The cdf s-combination proce-
dure is described first because it is the key ingredient
in making performance generalisation possible. The
bootstrapping procedure that considers the correla-
tion structure of similarity scores is described in Sec-
tion 2.3. Finally, we present the procedure of estimat-
ing DET confidence given a set of bootstrapped DET
curves in Section 2.4. These three components, namely,
combining cdf s, bootstrapping, and DET confidence,
form the basis of the proposed performance generali-
sation algorithm, which is summarised in Section 2.5.
2.2 Conditional estimate of cdf
To begin, we consider a conditioning variable, Q,
to be discrete and disjoint from one another. The
distribution of a factor-specific class-conditional score
can then be described by p(y|ωk, Q) for a biometric
similarity score y and class ωk where ω1 denotes a
match (genuine) comparison and ω0 denotes a non-
match (impostor) comparison. Therefore, if the score
is similarity score, we expect that E[y|ω1] > E[y|ω0],
that is the mean match score is greater than the mean
non-match score. The score distribution independent
of any factor, p(y|ωk), is simply a mixture of the
factor-specific score distributions weighted by their
respective prior probability of the factor, P (Q|ωk) ,
i.e.,
p(y|ωk) =
∑
Q
p(y|ωk, Q)P (Q|ωk) (1)
where we note that the prior probability of the factor
P (Q|ωk) is dependent on the class of comparison,
ωk. This conditioning variable may or may not be
necessary. We shall give two examples below.
Example: If one deals with quality factors, then,
P (Q|ωk) becomes P (Q) because in the case of quality
factors, the variable Q does not depend on the class
of comparison. On the other hand, if we consider the
scenario of spoofing with different materials, then,
P (Q|ω1) is always 1 for live, genuine (match) compari-
son whereas P (Q|ω0) takes several different values for
different spoof fabrication materials. Let us consider
the fingerprint database that we will be using. In this
case, Q denotes that a query sample is either a live one
or produced by any of the five fake fingerprint fabrica-
tion materials, i.e., Q ∈ {Live, Ecoflex, Gelatine, Latex,
Silgum, WoodGlue}. In the above two examples, the
probability tables should take the form as shown in
Tables 1 and 2, respectively. We note that
∑
imi = 1.
The reader should appreciate the “overloaded”
meaning of variable Q. This is because it allows us
to convenient apply the conditioning variable to the
data set by simply specifying P (Q|ωk). Throughout
this paper, Q is considered a conditioning variable,
or a “factor”, in the most general context. However,
the user has to be sensible when specifying values
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TABLE 1: An example of probability table Prob(Q|ωk)
when Q denotes different fabrication materials.
Q P (Q|ω0) P (Q|ω1)
Live 0 1
Ecoflex m1 0
Gelatine m2 0
Latex m3 0
Silgum m4 0
WoodGlue m5 0
TABLE 2: An example of probability table Prob(Q|ωk)
when Q denotes different quality levels.
Q P (Q|ω0) P (Q|ω1)
Quality level 1 m01 m
1
1
Quality level 2 m02 m
1
2
Quality level 3 m03 m
1
3
Quality level 4 m04 m
1
4
Quality level 5 m05 m
1
5
for P (Q|ωk). For instance, it is not possible to have
a live sample fabricated by any material. For this
reason, in Table 1, P (Q 6= Live|ω0) is always zero
whereas P (Q = Live|ω1) is always one. As a second
example, in the case where Q denotes the quality level
of a sample, it will need to set P (Q|ω0) and P (Q|ω1)
carefully because they are likely to have different
values. For example, in real biometric applications, a
genuine user will likely interact in a more correct way
with the sensor than an imposter, leading to a better
quality of samples, i.e, P (Q = high|ω1) dominates
over other quality levels whereas P (Q = low|ω0)
dominates in the case of impostor attempts. There
these priors have to be set differently for differet
P (Q|ωk), as examplified by Table 2.
Very often, the form of distribution of p(y|ωk, Q), is
assumed to be estimated via a parametric technique
such as any exponential family of one dimensional
distribution or else a non-parametric technique such
as the Parzen window or kernel density.
Fortunately, since our ultimate purpose is to esti-
mate biometric performance, we do not need to esti-
mate any density. Instead, we need only to estimate
of cumulative density function (cdf) of the scores for
a given decision threshold τ . Starting from Eqn. (1),
we can see that the cdf of factor-independent score,
P (y < τ |ωk), is the summation of the mixture of cdfs
of factor-specific score, P (y < τ |ωk, Q), weighted by
their respective probability factor table, P (Q|ωk) , i.e.,
P (y < τ |ωk) =
∑
Q
P (y < τ |ωk, Q)P (Q|ωk) (2)
The False Match Rate (FMR) is defined by the 1- cdf
of similarity scores belonged to non-match class, ω0,
being greater than the decision threshold, τ , whereas
the the False Non-match Rate (FNMR) is defined by
the cdf of similarity scores belonged to match class,
ω1, being smaller than the decision threshold, τ , that
is:
FMR(τ) = 1− P (y < τ |ω0) (3)
FNMR(τ) = P (y < τ |ω1) (4)
We note that FMR is a monotonic decreasing function
of the decision threshold whereas FNMR is a mono-
tonic increasing function of the decision threshold in
the similarity score space.
In order to estimate FMR and FNMR for a given
test or target operation, we substitute Eqn. (2) into
the above two equations. In this process, we need to
further precise that Pˆtrain(y < τ |ω1, Q) comes from the
training or design data whereas Ptest(Q|ωk) depends
only on the target test or operational condition. The
resultant predicted FMR and FNMR are given by:
ˆFMRtest(τ) = 1−
∑
Q
Pˆtrain(y < τ |ω0, Q)Ptest(Q|ω0) (5)
ˆFNMRtest(τ) =
∑
Q
Pˆtrain(y < τ |ω1, Q)Ptest(Q|ω1) (6)
respectively, for all possible τ values. We can then plot
a ROC or DET curve based on the pair (FMR, FNMR)
for all possible τ values.
The main assumption deployed in Eqn. (5) and
Eqn. (6) is that the error rate curve of a given factor
remains the same in the design and operational (test)
conditions. This is to say Pˆtrain(y < τ |ω0, Q) and
Pˆtest(y < τ |ω0, Q) are the same. This condition is
satisfied if, and only if, all other factors remain the
same between the design (train) and operational (test)
conditions. What is not required to remain the same
is the prior probability of the factors P (Q|ωk), which
can vary across the two data sets. In addition, the
subjects in the design and operational conditions may
also be mutually exclusive. This corresponds to a typ-
ical evaluation scenario where the biometric samples
used for algorithm development and those used for
a target application belong to two disjoint population
of subjects.
Because of the difference in subject composition,
one cannot guarantee that Pˆtrain(y < τ |ω1, Q) and
Pˆtest(y < τ |ω1, Q) are the same. The only way to val-
idate the assumption is by carrying out evaluations.
This will be further discussed in Section 4.
2.3 Subset Bootstrapping of cdf
The conventional confidence interval estimation as-
sumes that all samples are independent and identi-
cally distributed. This assumption is violated in any
outcome of a biometric experiment. This is because
the comparison scores originated from the same tem-
plate are dependent on each other. For this reason, if
there are U users, the user identity set with replace-
ment should be used to sample. The scores that are
associated with the bootstrapped user set will then
constitute a bootstrapped sample of the scores which
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then constitute the data required to estimate the cdf.
A set of these cdf’s form the basis for the estimates of
FMR and FNMR.
Suppose that there are U enrolled users in the set,
u ∈ U = {1, . . . , U}. The scores of these users can
be further divided into match and non-match scores;
they are denoted by YU0 ≡ {y|u, ω0, u ∈ U} and YU1 ≡
{y|u, ω1, u ∈ U} respectively.
The bootstrapping procedure takes the above two
sets of scores and produces N FMR and FNMR
curves, as shown in Algorithm 1. The function “boot-
strap” takes a set of identity and returns another set
of identities with possible repetitions. The algorithm
outputs a set of FMR and FNMR curves.
Algorithm 1 The Bootstrap_subset procedure
INPUT:
• Υ, the range of decision thresholds sampled at
regular intervals
• N , the number of bootstraps
• YU0 , non-match score set
• YU1 , match scores set
OUTPUT: (FMRi(τ),FNMRi(τ)) for i = 1, . . . , N
bootstraps and τ ∈ Υ
for i = 1 to N do
U ′ = bootstrap(U)
FMRi(τ) = 1− cdf(YU ′0 ) for τ ∈ Υ
FNMRi(τ) = cdf(YU ′1 ) for τ ∈ Υ
end for
The reader should note that FMR and FNMR are
continuous functions and should be sampled at dif-
ferent locations specified by τ ∈ Υ. Υ should cover
the possible range of values that a similarity score
can take but the number of samples does not need to
be excessive, as long as the resultant FMR and FNMR
are smooth.
2.4 Representing DET in polar coordinate system
The objective of this section is to characterise the
confidence interval of ˆFMRtest(τ) and ˆFNMRtest(τ)
respectively. Since the target chart we will visualise
is a DET curve, following Martin et al’s work, we will
work on the inverse cdf of the Gaussian distribution.
If Ψ(·) is the cdf of a Gaussian distribution, and Ψ−1(·)
its inverse, a DET curve is plotted in the coordinate
system of
v ≡ [vFMR, vFNMR] = [Ψ−1( ˆFMR(τ)),Ψ−1( ˆFNMR(τ))].
There are three ways to define the confidence in-
tervals of a DET curve, as discussed in Poh and
Bengio [10]. For example, the FMR can be fixed and
the confidence intervals of the corresponding FNMR
are then defined. This is called vertical averaging.
Another method is to average the FMR and FNMR
for a given threshold. This strategy is called threshold
averaging. A third method is called “simultaneous
joint confidence regions”, which does not fix any
threshold nor any axes on the DET plan but instead
estimates a confidence region based on a set of paired
(FMR,FNMR) data points directly. Two variants were
reported in [2], i.e., fixed-width band [3] and working-
hotelling band [13]. The fixed-width band method, in
our context, obtains a confidence region that is defined
by two parallel DETs1 with a fixed width distance
such that the original observed DET is fully contained
inside the region. The working-hotelling band fits
the best regression line in the DET plan. Therefore,
it assumes that the class-conditional scores follow a
Gaussian distribution.
We follow the third approach as documented
in [10]. We first work in the polar coordinate of v,
which can be expressed in (θ, r) where
θ = tan−1
(
vFNMR(τ)− vFNMR(−∞)
vFMR(τ)− vFMR(−∞)
)
, (7)
and
r =
√
(vFNMR(τ)−vFNMR(−∞))2+(vFMR(τ)−vFMR(−∞))2 (8)
for θ ∈ [0, pi/2], r ∈ [0,∞] and
(vFMR(−∞), vFNMR(−∞)) is the origin. Since
Ψ−1(−∞) = −∞, in practice, we replace the origin
with the point (Ψ−1(1/T ),Ψ−1(1/T )) where T is the
total number of non-match (impostor) comparisons
rounded to the nearest and the larger power of 10.
For example, if the number of impostor attempts is
3,800, then 10,000 can be used.
In order to reverse the process from the polar
coordinate to the Cartesian coordinate v, we can apply
the following equations,
vFMR(τ) = r × cos(θ) + vFNMR(−∞) (9)
vFNMR(τ) = r × sin(θ) + vFMR(−∞) (10)
The FMR(τ) and FNMR(τ) is then obtained by ap-
plying the cdf of the Gaussian distribution, Ψ(·) , on
v, i.e., FMR = Ψ(vFMR) and FNMR = Ψ(vFNMR),
respectively.
To obtain α × 100% confidence given the set of
bootstrapped DET curves in polar coordinates, we
estimate the lower and upper bounds as:
1− α
2
≤ Ψθ(r) ≤ 1 + α
2
,
where Ψθ(r) is the empirical cdf of the radius r
observed from the bootstrapped curves for a given θ,
since each bootstrapped curve cuts through θ exactly
once. The lower and upper r will be given by rlower =
Ψ−1θ (
1−α
2 ) and rupper = Ψ
−1
θ (
1+α
2 ), respectively. Note
that the inverse of Ψθ, i.e., Ψ−1θ , requires linear inter-
1. The original method applies to the ROC plan.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 6
polation2. The corresponding lower (more optimistic)
DET curve is given by (rlower cos(θ), rlower sin(θ))
across all θ ∈ [0, pi/2]. The upper (less optimistic)
DET curve is defined similarly. By convention, the
significance threshold α is set to 0.05 so that one
obtains a 95% level of confidence. Note that DET
angle was reported in [1] to combine several DET
curves into a single one. Although DET angle seems
to be an uncommon choice, three θ values are ex-
tremely commonly used: {0, pi4 , pi2 }. They correspond
respectively to the estimate of confidence interval of
FMR at FNMR=0, EER and that of FNMR at FMR=0.
Therefore, the procedure described here can be seen
as a generalization to this practice.
2.5 Overall Algorithm
Having discussed the three core components of the
generalised DET prediction algorithm, this section
puts the algorithms together more formally. To begin,
we note that FMR and FNMR are each a function of
the common τ ∈ Υ. For this reason, for simplicity,
we omit τ . So, the reader should keep in mind that
FMR is a curve and in implementation, it is a vector
of length |Υ|.
In addition, we need to introduce factor-dependent
score set, YU,Qk ≡ {y|u, ωk, Q, u ∈ U} for k ∈ {0, 1},
such that the union of the scores forms the score set
YUk that we have defined earlier: YUk = ∪QYU,Qk .
Finally, just before presenting the algorithm, we will
also need the following procedures, presented in the
form of “procedure : input → output” to aid our
explanation:
• DET2radius : FMR, FNMR → {(θ, r)|θ ∈ Θ}
DET2radius takes FMR and FNMR as input
and produces the corresponding points in polar
coordinates, as described by Eqn. (7) and Eqn. (8).
• Radius2DET : (θ, r)→ vFMR, vFNMR
Radius2DET convert the vFMR,vFNMR from po-
lar coordinate to Cartesian coordinate, as de-
scribed by Eqn. (9) and Eqn. (10).
• Percentile : {r} → (rlower, rmedian, rupper)
Percentile takes a set of real-numbered data
as input and produces the desired percentage at
5%, 50%(medium) and 95% of the data.
Having formalized the variables, we are now ready
to present the generalized DET curve with factors
that produce confidence intervals, as shown in Algo-
rithm 2. The main arguments of the procedure are: (1)
the number of bootstraps, N ; (2) |Q| factor-dependent
match score sets and (3) their desired probabilities on
the target operation, P (Q|ω1); as well as (4) |Q| factor-
dependent non-match score sets, and (5) their desired
2. In our implementation, we verified that by projecting a DET
curve into polar coordinates and then reversing the process, one
obtains exactly the same DET curve. Therefore, there is no loss
of generality by working in polar coordinates as long as the same
origin (as discussed in Section 2.4.
Algorithm 2 Generalised DET curve with confidence
intervals
INPUT:
• {YU,Q0 |∀Q} [The non-match score sets]
• {YU,Q1 |∀Q} [The match score sets]
• P (Q|ω0) [The prior probability factor table of
the non-match comparison on the target oper-
ation]
• P (Q|ω1) [The prior probability factor table of
the match comparison on the target operation]
• N [The number of bootstraps]
OUTPUT: (FMRs,FNMRs) for s ∈
{lower,meidan, uppper} [The confidence intervals]
for q ∈ Q do
{(FMRiq,FNMRiq)|i ∈ [1, N ]} = Bootstrap subset(
YU0,q,YU1,q, N )
end for
for i ∈ [1, . . . , N ] do
{rθi |∀θ∈Θ} = DET2radius(
∑
q∈Q FMR
i
qP (q|ω0),∑
q∈Q FNMR
i
qP (q|ω1) )
end for
(rθlower, r
θ
median, r
θ
upper) = Percentile({rθi |i =
1, . . . , N}), ∀θ∈Θ
for s ∈ {lower,meidan, uppper} do
(FMRs,FNMRs) = Radius2DET({rθs |∀θ})
end for
prior probabilities on the target operation, P (Q|ω0).
The procedure returns the confidence intervals of
the predicted DET curve corresponding to the target
operation in terms of the expected FMR and FNMR,
as well as their upper and lower bounds.
The two arguments to DET2radius, i.e.,∑
q∈Q FMR
i
qP (q|ω0) and
∑
q∈Q FNMR
i
qP (q|ω1)
each implements Eqn. (5) and Eqn. (6), respectively.
DET2radius is called in a loop of N iterations in order
to process the N bootstrapped FMRs and FNMRs.
3 DEMONSTRATIONS
3.1 Database, Protocols
We have chosen to use the LivDet 2011 data set [7]
for our demonstrations and experiments because this
database has a number of unique features. First, the
fingerprint images have been acquired using two
different sensors. This allows us to perform cross-
sensor comparison whereby the system is required
to compare two samples obtained using two different
sensors. The database also contains spoof fingerprint
impressions made by five different fabrication ma-
terials. These materials are EcoFlex, Gelatine, Latex,
Silgum and WoodGlue. This allows us to evaluate
the performance predicted using both zero-effort and
nonzero-effort attacks at different proportions. Third,
the database contains live fingerprint of different qual-
ity, thus, enabling us to study the effect of various
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levels of fingerprint quality on system performance
as nonzero effort attack.
The LivDET 2011 database contains 8000 samples.
The most important key statistics relevant for our
experiments are:
• 144 unique fingers containing both live and spoof
samples
• 128 unique fingers containing only live samples
• 4000 fingerprints acquired using the Biometrika
sensor, and another 4000 acquired using the Ital-
data sensor.
• 800 fake fingerprint samples for each of the five
fabrication materials.
3.1.1 Experimental Protocol
In order to estimate the quality of prediction, we kept
the 144 fingers which have both live and spoof sam-
ples as enrolment identities (constituting the gallery
set). In this way, we have both live and spoof compar-
ison scores which can be further divided into match
and non-match comparisons. Let u denote an identity
drawn from the set of identities, U . We divide U into
two smaller sets Utrain and Utest of equal size but
containing identities that are mutually exclusive. Let
Ytrain denote the comparison scores generated from
Utrain; and similarly, Ytest denotes the comparison
scores generated from Utest.
The data division procedure is repeated 100 times in
order to obtain 100 pairs of Utrain and Utest; and their
corresponding comparison scores, Ytrain and Ytest.
From the training score set, Ytrain, we obtain the
confidence intervals, the accuracy of which is then
assessed using the DET curve derived from Ytest.
3.1.2 4 Data sets and 13 Use-cases
In order to test the generalization ability of the DET
confidence intervals, we have prepared four data sets
in order to examine 13 use-cases of predicting DET
confidence intervals. The four data sets are described
below; and are summarised in Appendix3.
1) Zero-effort and spoof attacks: The first two data
sets evaluate the effect of both zero-effort and
spoof attacks on a fingerprint system. The two
data sets differ only by the sensor used – one
is based on the Biometrika sensor and another
is based on the Italdata sensor. For each data
set, the positive class consists of the live match
(genuine) score, whereas the non-match scores
consist of six sets – the spoof samples due to
five fabrication materials and the zero-effort (non-
match) comparison. Because there is only one
set of match (genuine) score, hence one factor,
P (Q|ω1) = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]. However, for the non-
match score sets, Q could take any of the six
states. Therefore, P (Q|ω0) is a probability table
3. http://personal.ee.surrey.ac.uk/Personal/Norman.Poh/
data/norman\ eer\ trend\ mmbio\ journal\ v2\ Appendix.pdf
with six values. We have considered three sce-
narios, namely,
a) Balanced attack: This consists of setting the
probability of spoof attacks due to any of the
five materials to be equal. In addition, prob-
ability of zero-effort attack is as likely as any
of the spoof attack. For this reason, the prior
probability of the non-match score is specified
by:
Prob(Q|ω0) =
[P (Q = Live|ω0),
P (Q = Ecoflex|ω0), P (Q = Gelatin|ω0),
P (Q = Latex|ω0), P (Q = Silgum|ω0),
P (Q = WoodGlue|ω0), P (Q = Zero|ω0)]
and it is set the ratio [5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1] so that
Prob(Q|ω0) = [0.5, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1] for the
six elements. We use Prob(Q|ω0) to denote the
probability table whose elements are specified
by P (Q|ω0), a scalar value.
b) Spoof attack: This consists of the five
spoof materials so Prob(Q|ω0) is set to the
ratio [0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1] or assuming the value
[0, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2].
c) Zero-effort attack: In this case, Prob(Q|ω0) =
[1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0].
Although it is possible to consider all other sce-
narios, such as the attack due to the individual
materials, or a combination of materials, due to
room consideration, we have opted to cover more
variety scenarios that will be described next.
2) Cross-sensor matching: Insofar as the data
set permits us, we can consider the cross
matching due to two sensors. This gives us
three possibilities, namely, matching involv-
ing the same sensor, such as Biometrika-vs-
Biometrika (Biometrika template vs Biometrika
query), Italdata-vs-Italdata, and Biometrika-vs-
Italdata. We use a symmetric comparison score
such as Biometrika-vs-Italdata and Italdata-vs-
Biometrika give exactly the same result. There-
fore, the use-case scenarios considered are:
a) Biometrika only comparisons,
b) Italdata only comparisons,
c) Both sensors – comparisons involving both sen-
sors excluding cross-sensor comparisons.
d) cross-sensor operation – all possible compar-
isons including the cross-sensor ones.
3) Comparisons under varying levels of quality: In
the case of discrete quality measures, it is possible
to separate the biometric samples into various
categories. The NFIQ that is applied to fingerprint
enables us to divide the fingerprint samples into
five levels of quality. However, the proportion of
levels 4 and 5 are so small that we combine both
of them. In order to obtain sufficient samples,
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this gives us the following four categories: 1,
2, 3, and 4&5. The match and non-match score
sets are thus divided into these four subsets. We
then considered three scenarios among the many
possibilities:
a) High quality tendency: This is the default case
where the majority of the samples are of high
quality (level 1). The next level of quality (level
2) has half the samples, and so on. This gives
us the ratio of Prob(Q|ω1) and Prob(Q|ω0) to
be [8, 4, 2, 1] for both match and non-match
comparisons.
b) Low quality tendency: By the same token of
argument, we also consider a realistic worst
case scenario of [1, 2, 4, 8].
c) Equal-prior quality: Finally, we also considered
an equal-prior quality scenario of [1, 1, 1, 1].
3.2 Case demonstrations
In this section, a demonstration of the derived DET
confidence intervals of assessing biometric perfor-
mance under varying levels of quality is given. The
deomostration of other applications is presented in
Appendix3.
(i) Varying levels of quality: We repeated the same
process of varying quality levels. In this case, we
used the NIST fingerprint matcher (bozorth3) as well
as its fingerprint quality, namely, NFIQ, which gives
five levels of quality. Consequently, we divided each
of the match and non-match comparison scores into
four sets, thereby, binning the quality levels 1, 2
and 3 as three sets and the fourth set contains the
combined quality levels 4 and 5. This is because the
number of samples in this last set is often very small.
The cdf s of the these eight score sets are shown in
Figure 3(a). As can be observed, the 1-cdf s of the non-
match comparisons do not change significantly with
quality measures, whereas the match comparisons
vary significantly across the quality levels.
We then identify three scenarios with different
quality tendency, namely high quality tendency, low
quality tendency, and equal-prior quality. In the first
case, quality level one (the best quality) has a stronger
prior whereas the combined quality levels 4 and 5
(the worst quality) have a much smaller prior. In the
second case, the priors are switched, causing the low
quality samples to dominate. We, therefore, expect the
DET curve of the second case to be significantly worse
than the first case. In the third case, all quality levels
are given the same prior, which is 1/4 in our case,
since we have four sets of scores for each of the match
and non-match comparisons. The results are shown in
Figures 3(b)–(d), respectively.
4 DISCUSSION, EVALUATION AND RESULTS
This section addresses the issue of how well an un-
seen DET curve is predicted using the confidence
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(c) low quality tendency
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(d) equal-prior quality
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Fig. 3: The FMRS and FNMRS for the quality-
dependent setting. The DET curves of three use-cases:
(b) high quality tendency, (c) low quality tendency,
and (d) equal-prior quality.
intervals derived from the proposed procedure. For
this purpose, there must be a training and a test set.
One requirement is that the enrolled subjects in the
two sets must be mutually exclusive. This reflects a
real application whereby the population in the design
set is usually different from those in the operational
setting.
Before we provide any details about the experi-
ments, we summarize a number of properties that
we know about the confidence intervals of a DET
curve. These not only allow us to rule out a number of
hypotheses, but also enable us to design experiments
testing the unknown.
4.1 What we know, and we do not know about
DET Confidence Intervals
Poh and Bengio [10] designed a number of experi-
ments in order to study the properties of the confi-
dence intervals around a DET curve. Their findings
can be summarized as follows:
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• Between the sample variability and user-
variability, the latter has a larger effect.
For example, 1000 match comparison scores
constituted by 100 subjects each contributing
10 match scores are more representative than
1000 match comparison scores constituted by
10 subjects each contributing 100 match scores.
The DET confidence intervals estimated by the
former will be more representative. Therefore, in
order to generate enough samples, we recruit a
large number of subjects rather than acquiring
more samples from a limited pool of users.
• The DET confidence intervals estimated from a
larger subject population will have smaller confi-
dence intervals. Poh and Bengio showed that by
increasing the size of the subject from 10, 20 and
40 to 80, the relative estimate of the correspond-
ing DET confidence intervals are visibly reduced.
They also objectively measured the reduction in
terms of entropy, demonstrating that with an
increasing size of subjects, the entropy decreases,
hence, showing a sharper distribution of the DET
curve or narrower confidence intervals.
• Using the DET curve of a completely different
population of subjects for testing, the confidence
intervals of a DET curve has a coverage of be-
tween 67% and 83%, depending on the choice
of database and biometric systems. Coverage is
a measure of proportion of the predicted DET
curve that falls in the visible region of the confi-
dence intervals.
In their conclusion section, the authors highlighted the
challenge of generalizing a DET curve from one con-
text to another. Poh and Bengio’s two-step bootstrap
procedure cannot generalize the DET curve as soon as
the context of application changes because the method
has no means of detecting factors or covariates that
can influence the performance of a biometric system.
The above conclusion directly points to the need
for evaluating, how well one can predict the unseen
DET curve, when the factors are explicitly identified.
In light of this, it is imperative to evaluate the cover-
age of the proposed DET confidence intervals under
different scenarios. For this purpose, we set up 13 use-
cases from four data sets.
4.2 Evaluation Criteria
We shall introduce three assessment criteria, namely
coverage and angle-dependent coverage, as well
as the Komolgorov-Smirnov (KS) test of difference.
While coverage is used to assess the quality of a
predicted DET curve experimental outcome, angle-
dependent coverage is used to assess the quality of
prediction across a set of experiments, for a given DET
angle. The KS-test measures the discrepancy between
the training and test score distribution in order to
gauge how much the mismatch in population may
account to the imperfect prediction of a DET curve.
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Fig. 4: An example demonstrating how coverage is
calculated. The portion of the unseen, test DET curve
falling inside the DET 95% confidence intervals (red
dashed lines) is used to calculate the coverage of the
test curve.
4.2.1 Coverage
Coverage is defined by the proportion of the DET
curve contained within the confidence intervals of the
DET curve derived from the training set. Let rtest(θ)
be the DET curve of the test set represented in the
polar coordinate (r, θ), and ruppertrain (θ) and r
lower
train (θ) be
the upper and lower confidence bound. Coverage is
defined as the proportion of the test DET curve that
falls inside the computable angles of the confidence
bound, Θ ≡ {θ|ruppertrain (θ) < ∞ ∧ −∞ < rlowertrain (θ), θ ∈
[0o, 90o]}:
coverage =
|{θ|rlowertrain (θ) < rtest(θ) < ruppertrain (θ),∀θ∈Θ}|
|{θ|∀θ∈Θ}|
Figure 4 illustrates an example of a test DET curve
where a portion of the curve falls inside the DET
confidence intervals and another portion falls outside
the intervals. The portion that falls inside the intervals
is the coverage. Although the computation of cover-
age is carried out in the polar coordinates, we have
back-projected them to the (FMR,FNMR) coordinates
for visualisation here. Although there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the two representations, the
polar coordinates can sometimes capture points on the
non-visible part of the DET curve; these points are
excluded from the calculation of coverage.
4.2.2 Angle-dependent Coverage
In addition to coverage, we also introduce another
similar assessment known as angle-dependent cover-
age. While coverage is used to assess the outcome
of a single instance of a predicted DET curve across
all computable angles; angle-dependent coverage as-
sesses the quality of prediction of a given angle, across
a set of DET prediction experiments. We are interested
in angle-dependent coverage because we want to see
if the errors in predicting a DET curve (in terms of
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coverage) is distributed equally across all the angles
or not.
In order to formalise the calculation of angle-
dependent coverage, we consider only the com-
putable angles, θ ∈ Θ. We also use similar notation as
before except that the DET curves in the polar coor-
dinates are augmented by an experiment enumerator
t = 1, . . . , T . Let rtest,t(θ) be the DET curve of the test
set represented in the polar coordinate of experiment
t; and similarly ruppertrain,t(θ) and r
lower
train,t(θ) be the upper
and lower confidence bound, also of experiment t. The
angle-dependent coverage is defined as the propor-
tion of the valid (or computable) angle falling inside
the confidence bound:
coverage(θ) =
|{r(θ)|rlowertrain,t(θ) < r(θ) < ruppertrain,t(θ)}|
T
and r(θ) ∈ {rtest,t(θ), t ∈ [1, T ]}. The above equation
is repeated for all computable DET angles θ ∈ Θ
(between 0o and 90o). In short, the numerator in the
above angle-dependent coverage counts the number
of times out of T experiments that a given angle of
the predicted DET curve falls inside its corresponding
confidence intervals.
In practice, when carrying out the above calcula-
tion, the numerator is either T or less because we
have to exclude the cases where some of the DET
angles are not computable due to lack of data. This
naturally happens because the countable errors are
finite, especially at very low FNMR or FMR, noting
that the precision of FNMR is smaller than that of
FMR by one or two orders of magnitude depending
on data sets. These cases translate to DET angles near
0o or 90o, respectively.
4.2.3 Test of difference in distribution between the
training and test scores
A key assumption of the proposed algorithm is that
the factor-specific cdf of the training and the test
sets are the same, that is, Ptrain(y < τ |ωk, Q) and
Ptest(y < τ |ωk, Q) comparable. Equivalently, we want
to test the two samples that have been used to derive
the above probabilities, namely, {y|Qk, training} and
{y|Qk, test}, are the same. There are a number of
tests that can be used, such as measuring relative
entropy, test of means difference (student’s t-test),
or two-sample Komolgorove-Smirnov test (KS-test).
While the first method requires an estimate of density,
the second method is useful only for data where their
means are meaningful, hence, implicitly assuming a
single-mode distribution. The third method is non-
parametric and does not require any estimate of the
density. KS-test simply takes two cdf s and finds the
maximum vertical distance between them, that is,
KS-stat = arg max
x
|F1(x)− F2(x)|
In our context, we can directly use P (y < τ |Qk, set}
where set can either be the training or the test set,
each replacing F1 and F2 above.
The null hypothesis of the KS-test is that the two
score sets being compared are drawn from the same
distribution whereas the alternative hypothesis is that
they are drawn from two different distributions. The
KS-stat is compared to a critical value that is de-
pendent on the number of samples, as well as the
significant level, α, which is set to 0.05. Alternatively,
one can calculate the P-value of the KS-stat and check
if this value exceeds the α level or not. A P-value
that is smaller than the significant α level suggests
that one can reject the null hypothesis. In summary, a
high KS-stat is likely to lead to small P-value, which
in turn leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis,
suggesting that the two sets of data are different.
4.3 Results
We present three sets of experiments. The first aims to
study the generalisation ability of the DET confidence
intervals under population mismatch. The second set
of experiments assesses the stability of factor-specific
score distribution across two different populations of
subjects. This represents a secondary but important
analysis because it provides an explanation as to why
perfect predictability cannot be achieved by explicitly
measuring the discrepancy between training and test
factor-specific score distributions. The third set aims to
study if there is a particular DET angle that is harder
to predict than others, that is, if FNMR is harder to
predict than FMR, or vice-versa.
4.3.1 Coverage
The coverage for all the 13 use-cases is shown in
Figure 5. Each box-plot contains 100 bootstrapped
samples. The expected coverage is more than 75% for
the first four score data sets. The range of coverage
values obtained here is consistent with Poh and Ben-
gio’s study [10]. If we were to measure the coverage
using the same training set, we would have obtained
100%. The discrepancy between the training and the
test sets is possibly due to the mismatch in subjects
between the training and the test sets. This is further
verified in the next set of experiments.
The following observations can be made:
• The DET curves with zero-effort attacks are some-
what easier to predict than those with spoof
attacks.
• The DET curves with cross-device comparison are
somewhat harder to predict than those with a
single-device only curves.
• The DET curves with high or low quality ten-
dency curves can be predicted at the same or
comparable level of accuracy.
4.3.2 Secondary analysis
The KS-stat and P-value for the 13 use-cases are
shown in Figures 6(a) and (b). In (c), the proportion
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Fig. 5: Box-plots of coverage across two tasks and
13 use-cases. Each box-plot contains 100 bootstraps of
experiments for one of the 13 use-cases. Coverage is
measured on the unseen test curve with a different
population of subjects than the training set from
which the confidence intervals have been derived.
of the null hypothesis being rejected, out of the 100
bootstrapped samples, is also plotted. As it turns out,
most of the tests rejected the null hypothesis.
However, what is not expected is that the null
hypotheses for the zero-effort attack and non-match
comparisons are also rejected. This is because the
KS-stat for the zero-effort impostor is very small,
indicating that the pair of data sets should come
from the same distribution. Consequently, we would
have expected that its P-value to be relative large.
See Figures 6(a) and (b) for the zero-effort non-match
comparisons; (c) for Biometrika and Italdata non-
match comparisons; and (d) for quality-dependent
q1–q5 non-match comparisons.
However, in each case, their P-value turns out to
distribute around zero. After a careful investigation,
we found that this is because there are a lot more non-
match samples, in the order of 400 thousand samples.
As a result, the large KS-stat is offset by the large
samples, leading to very small P-values for this class.
4.3.3 Angle-dependent Coverage
As a final analysis, we look at the DET angle-
dependent coverage. This looks at the 100 bootstraps
of 13 use-cases. This enables to study the behaviour
of 1,300 observations of DET coverage for each of the
angles, θ ∈ {00, . . . , 900}. Each DET angle is divided
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(c) Cross sensor comparison
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Fig. 6: Two-sample Komolgorov-Smirnov test of
whether or not the training and test score distribu-
tions are the same.
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Fig. 7: (a) The number of invalid or unobserved val-
ues, uncovered, and covered cases out of the 13 use-
cases each having 100 bootstrap experiments. (b)The
coverage of 1,300 use-case experiments for each DET
angle. The minimum angle-dependent coverage is
57.5% and the maximum is 90.3%.
into three parts: invalid or unobserved angle, covered,
and uncovered angle. The invalid angles are those
for which no value can be calculated simply because
no data is available. The covered angles are those
whose test DET curve is covered by the confidence
intervals derived from the training data; whereas the
uncovered angles are those falling outside the DET
confidence intervals.
Figure 7(a) shows the frequency of the three types
of DET angles derived from the 1,300 bootstrap ex-
periments.
We note that the low DET angles which correspond
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 12
to the low FNMR has no value. This is because the
precision FNMR, is often significantly lower than
that of the FMR. The low precision is due to the
disproportionately smaller number of match samples
than that of the non-match samples.
All the valid DET angles have a coverage between
57.5% and the maximum is 90.3%, as shown in Fig-
ure 7. By using only the DET-angles that are valid, the
2.5-th, 50-th and the 97.5-th percentiles of the cover-
age across the valid DET-angle dependent curves are
60.5%, 70.1%, and 80.3%, respectively.
Our result here shows that there is little bias as
to whether or not a particular angle of a DET curve
is harder to predict. Put differently, every DET angle
has an equal chance of being predicted correctly, and
the probability of this is around 60% to 80% under
an mismatched population; and they are significantly
better than random, which is 50%. Without any mis-
matched population, the probability of this is 100%,
which corresponds to the absolute upper bound. This
shows that DET curve prediction task is difficult; and
there is still much room for improvement.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a framework for
computing a DET curve with confidence intervals,
aiming to predict the most likely performance of a
biometric system on an unseen target population of
subjects. This is achieved by explicitly modelling the
cdf s of the identified factors. We have demonstrated
the feasibility of this approach on 4 different tasks
across 13 use-cases. These tasks assess the following
scenarios: the impact of the performance of the system
under multiple sensors and quality levels, and nature
of attacks (zero effort versus nonzero-effort imper-
sonation). For each use-case scenario of a given task,
we sampled two mutually exclusive sets of subjects,
simulating a design and a target test environment
with different subjects. The design data set is used
to derive a DET confidence intervals whereas the
test data set is used to assess to what extent the
DET confidence intervals can predict the unseen DET
curve. The prediction quality is measured in terms
of coverage. Across 1,300 experiments with bootstrap-
ping, we found that the coverage at the curve level,
as well as at the DET angle level is between 60 and
80%. Although this performance is much better than
chance, there is still room for improvement.
Across 1900 experiments, we found that the cover-
age at the curve level, as well as at the DET angle level
is between 60 and 90%. Although this performance
is much better than chance, there is still room for
improvement.
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